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Restructuring and reforms 
in the Korean banking industry 
Soo-Myung Kim, Ji-Young Kim and Hoon-Tae Ryoo 
I. Introduction 
The Korean banking industry has undergone substantial structural reforms since the 1997 financial 
crisis. A number of banks merged or exited, and foreign banks were permitted to enter the banking 
industry. Perhaps most significantly, there have been fundamental changes in the behavior of banks; 
they are now focusing much more on profitability and competitiveness than they did in the past. They 
are also assuming an increasingly important role as comprehensive asset managers. 
The structural and managerial reform effort has indeed improved banks’ solvency and profitability. 
Banks have performed better in nearly every respect and in a relatively short period of time. There has 
been especially marked improvement in productivity, risk management, and business process 
innovation. The long-held belief that “banks never fail because the government will bail them out” has 
nearly faded away completely. People in the financial sector are beginning to consider their 
occupation separately from their workplace. There has been considerable progress in financial 
opening and liberalization with an eye toward efficiency. 
Korea is widely acknowledged to possess qualified human resources in the financial industry. They 
have a mastery of the latest in information technology in addition to a high level of competence in 
taking on board changes in global industry trends. It is primarily thanks to these resources that banks 
were able to stage a remarkable turnaround and revitalize their management so efficiently after the 
crisis. 
The financial industry is a high value-added industry with great potential to create jobs and to grow 
quickly. Now is the time to capitalize on the progress that has been made thanks to the reforms. Banks 
must continue to improve efficiency and sharpen their competitive edge if they hope to prosper in the 
fiercely competitive global market. 
II. Restructuring and Reforms in the Banking Industry 
1. Banking Sector Restructuring 
As financial liberalization and market opening started in the mid-1980s and accelerated in the 1990s, 
competition among financial institutions became fiercer, and their risk exposures widened greatly. 
Amid looming financial risks, the Korean economy entered a period of sluggish economic growth in the 
mid-1990s due to the erosion of its comparative cost advantage and problems of surplus capacity in 
many industries. 
In the midst of such unfavorable environmental shifts, banks should have striven to improve 
profitability and efficiency. Instead, they sought to expand their market share without consideration for 
risk management. As a result, a number of banks suddenly found themselves in financial distress, and 
their situation rapidly worsened with a spate of large corporate bankruptcies, and an ensuing credit 
crunch in the market. The credit crunch, paradoxically, brought the one result that the banks feared 
most, i.e. more corporate bankruptcies, thereby further worsening their asset quality. 
Soon after the onset of the crisis, the Korean financial authorities implemented a prompt corrective 
action (PCA) system. In this system, the capital adequacy ratio forms the most important indicator of 
the need for PCA. After an evaluation in June 1998, the authorities decided to close five banks whose 
Basel capital adequacy ratios had already fallen below 8% at the end of 1997. It was decided that 
these banks would be acquired by five healthier banks through purchase and assumption (P&A), 
which allows the selective acquisition of assets and assumption of liabilities. P&A was preferred to 
liquidation or to merger and acquisition on the grounds that the adverse effects on the related 
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depositors, borrowers and the government, let alone the acquirers, would be smaller and that the 
process could be completed in a shorter period of time. 
A further seven banks that had Basel capital adequacy ratios below 8% but were deemed capable of 
staging a turnaround were required, once their turnaround plans had been conditionally approved, to 
file implementation plans for management improvement with the Financial Supervisory Commission 
(FSC) by July 31, 1998. Items to be included in the plans were steps to strengthen their business 
through increasing their capital, changes in their management teams, and downsizing. The FSC’s 
Review Team then went through these plans, modifying and supplementing them before their 
finalization on September 15, 1998. The seven institutions in question accordingly carried out their 
rehabilitation plans involving mergers, capital increases by inducement of foreign capital, consolidation 
with subsidiaries, and partial limitations of their banking business activities. 
Healthy banks, meanwhile, were strongly encouraged to seek consolidation and develop universal 
banking services in order to become leaders in the banking sector. The biggest and most significant 
merger took place in November 2001, when Kookmin Bank and Housing & Commercial Bank merged 
to create Korea’s largest commercial bank. Because of the strengths and market positions of Kookmin 
Bank in retail banking and of Housing & Commercial Bank in mortgage lending, the merger of the two 
banks has generated a new wave of competitive pressures and contributed to further restructuring and 
consolidation in the banking sector. 
 
Changes in the Number of Banks 
January 1998-September 2005 
Exits and Mergers (B) 
 
No. of 
banks as of 
end-1997 
(A)  Exits Mergers
No. of banks 
newly 
established 
(C) 
No. of 
banks 
operating
(A-B+C) 
Banks 33 14 5 9 – 19 
Commercial banks 26 12 5 7 – 14 
Nation-wide banks 
Local banks 
(16) 
(10) 
(8) 
(4) 
(3) 
(2) 
(5) 
(2) 
– 
– 
(8) 
(6) 
Specialized banks 7 2 – 2 – 5 
 
Recapitalization of the financial sector was needed to relieve a paralyzing credit crunch at the 
beginning of the crisis and to restore the proper functioning of banks in their role as financial 
intermediaries. Keenly alert to this need, the government injected a huge amount of public funds into 
financial institutions, totaling 167.6 trillion won (including recycled funds) from November 1997 to July 
2005. Of this, some 86.8 trillion won was injected into banks. Funds were injected into troubled 
financial institutions for the payment of insured deposits and purposes of recapitalization mainly by the 
Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation, and for the purchase of NPLs (non-performing loans) by the 
Korean Asset Management Corporation. 
The public funds were raised mainly by issuing bonds of the Deposit Insurance Fund run by KDIC 
(81.6 trillion won) and bonds of the Non-Performing Loans Management Fund run by KAMCO 
(20.5 trillion won), from government fiscal sources (20.2 trillion won), and recycled funds (40.9 trillion won). 
Bonds of both the Deposit Insurance Fund and the Non-performing Loans Management Fund are 
guaranteed by the government. To prevent possible side effects like a run-up in interest rates or a 
crowding-out effect through their issue in the market, the government paid financial institutions for the 
purchase of NPLs directly with the bonds or participated in the equity of banks by the subscription of 
these bonds for their recapitalization. 
In order to mitigate moral hazard, the authorities assisted distressed financial institutions on the 
condition that the institutions made efforts to reduce costs, recapitalize themselves by inducing foreign 
investments, and write down the capital of existing shareholders. However, the government has been 
criticized for supporting nonviable institutions, for injecting excessive liquidity in some cases, and for 
doing too little to recover funds. Responding to this criticism, in February 2001 it established a Public 
Fund Oversight Committee to enhance the transparency and efficiency of fund management and 
expedite the recovery of funds. 
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Trend of Banking Industry Change 
1997.12  1998.6  1999.1-6  1999.7-12 2000 2001  2002  2003  Current 
Commercial            
Hanil    
Hanvit 
        
Peace             
Kwangju             
Kyongnam        
Woori 
BHC 
     
Woori 
BHC 
(Woori) 
(Kwangju) 
(Kyongnam) 
Chohung          
Chungbuk    
Chohung 
      
Kangwon      
Chohung
 
 
     
Shinhan          
Donghwa  
Shinhan 
     
 
   
Cheju          
Shinhan 
BHC 
 
Shinhan 
BHC 
 
Shinhan 
BHC 
(Shinhan) 
(Chohung) 
(Cheju) 
Hana          
Chungchong  
Hana 
        
Boram    
Hana 
       
Seoul          
Hana  
  
Hana 
Kookmin          
Daedong  
Kookmin 
        
Longterm 
Credit 
   
Kookmin 
       
Housing           
Dongnam  
Housing 
     
Kookmin 
   
 
 
Kookmin 
Koram             
Kyongki  
Koram 
           
Citibank 
Korea1 
First              SC First 
Exchange              Exchange 
Daegu              Daegu 
Chonbuk              Chonbuk 
Pusan              Pusan 
            Agricultural 
Cooperatives 
Livestock 
Cooperatives 
      
Agri- 
cultural 
Cooper
atives       
Agricultural 
Cooperatives
Fisheries 
Cooperatives 
             Fisheries 
Cooperatives
1  Citibank Korea was established by consolidating the fifteen branches of Citibank in Korea and Koram Bank on November 1, 
2004. 
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Public Funds Raised and Injected 
November 1997-July 2005 
In trillions of won 
Source Recapitaliz-ation 
Compensat-
ion for losses 
Repayment 
of deposit 
Purchase 
of assets 
Purchase 
of NPLs Total 
Issue of 
bonds 42.2 15.2 20.0 4.2 20.5 102.1
2 
Collected 
funds 7.3 2.5 7.4 6.4 17.4 40.9 
Fiscal 
sources 13.9 – – 6.3 – 20.2 
Others1 0.1 0.2 2.9 0.1 1.1 4.3 
Total 63.5 17.8 30.3 17.0 39.0 167.6 
1  Borrowing from financial institutions, deposit insurance premium, etc.   2  Deposit Insurance Fund Bonds (81.6 trillion won) 
and Non-Performing Loans Management Fund Bonds (20.5 trillion won). 
 
The government found itself forced to nationalize several commercial banks in the process of financial 
restructuring after the financial crisis in 1997. The major objectives of privatization of the state-owned 
banks have been to promote competitiveness of the banking industry by securing the introduction of 
management accountability through private ownership and to seamlessly recoup the public funds 
injected for financial restructuring. Strengthening market discipline by minimizing the scope for 
government intervention served as another reason. 
The government, along with Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), has privatized four nationalized 
banks (Korea First, Cheju, Seoul, and Chohung) since 1999 by selling its equity stakes in them. In 
December 1999, the government sold a 51% stake in Korea First Bank to Newbridge Capital. In April 2005, 
the government also sold its entire remaining equity participation to Standard Chartered Bank, which had 
already bought Newbridge Capital’s stake in Korea First Bank’s equity capital. Cheju Bank and Chohung 
Bank were acquired by Shinhan Financial Holding Company Group as its subsidiaries in April 2002 and 
July 2003, respectively. Seoul Bank merged with Hana Bank in November 2002. 
2. Banking Sector Reforms 
Strengthening Prudential Regulation 
The authorities strengthened prudential regulation of banks to improve their soundness and stability, 
bringing them into line with international best practice. New regulations, once introduced and revised 
in the banking sector, were promptly applied in other parts of the financial sector with slight 
modifications to reflect the particular characteristics of each type of financial institution. 
As a first step, a PCA (prompt corrective action) system was introduced in April 1998. PCAs allow the 
financial supervisory authorities to automatically issue an order to a particular financial institution 
whenever management conditions fall below a preset level. This system helps maintain financial 
soundness and stability and minimizes the social costs arising from financial distress or bankruptcy. 
Secondly, the criterion for classification of banking assets as substandard was changed from those non-
performing for six months to those non-performing for three months (Sep. 1998). The criterion for 
classification as precautionary was also changed from those non-performing for three months to those non-
performing for one month (Sep. 1998). And forward-looking criteria (FLC), which are standards for classifying 
asset soundness based on the future payment capacity of borrowers, were introduced for banks (Dec. 1999). 
Thirdly, to reduce the risk resulting from large credit exposures to a single entity, the ceiling on credits 
to a single individual or juridical person, as well as a single large business group, and ceilings on large 
credits, were lowered for banks (Apr. 1999). In detail, the ceiling on credits to a single individual or 
juridical person and that on credits to a single business group were brought down from 45% of bank’s 
equity capital to 20% and 25%, respectively, and the definition of “large credits” to a single individual 
or juridical person, whose total amount is limited to five times a bank’s equity, was narrowed from 15% 
of a bank’s equity capital to 10%. 
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Framework of Prompt Corrective Actions 
As of the end of September 2005 
Enforcement 
Section 
Management 
improvement 
Management 
improvement 
Management 
improvement 
<Banks, merchant banks> 
• BIS capital ratio:  
• below 6% • below 2% 
<Mutual savings banks> 
• BIS capital ratio:  
• below 3% • below 1% 
<Insurance companies> 
• solvency margin ratio: 
below 100% 
• below 50% • below 0% 
Financial Ratios 
<Securities companies> 
• equity capital ratio: below 
150% 
• below 120% • below 100% 
Evaluation of 
management 
status 
• composite rating: 3rd 
grade or above 
• component rating of asset 
quality or capital adequacy: 
below 4th 
• composite rating: below 
4th – 
Triggering 
requirements 
Other reasons 
• if obviously adjudged to 
meet the above mentioned 
requirements, due to 
serious financial incidents 
or bad loans 
• (same as left-hand 
column) 
• if it fails to faithfully 
implement its 
management 
improvement plan 
• if judged as a distressed 
financial institution 
• if deemed either to be 
unable to or not to be 
implementing its 
management 
improvement plan 
Measures 
• improvement in manpower 
and organizational 
management 
• cost reduction 
• restrictions on investments 
in fixed assets, entries into 
new business areas, and 
new capital investments 
• disposal of non-performing 
assets 
• restriction on dividends 
• arrangement of special 
loan loss provisions 
• closure, consolidation, 
or restriction on the 
establishment of business 
offices 
• reduction of 
organizational size 
• restrictions on holding 
risky assets and disposal 
of assets 
• divestiture of 
subsidiaries 
• demand for the 
replacement of directors 
• partial suspension of 
business 
(including measures at 
the recommendation 
stage) 
• retirement of all or part 
of the issued stocks 
• suspension of duties of 
top management 
• mergers or entry into 
FHCs as subsidiaries 
• transfer of all or part of 
business 
• suspension of business 
for up to six months 
 (including measures at 
the requirement stage) 
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Improving Transparency of Financial Institutions’ Management 
Inadequate disclosure and opaque decision making were often cited as reasons for the Korean 
financial system’s low credibility. Thus, in April 1998, the FSC introduced new disclosure 
requirements, including mandatory disclosure of information on the value of NPLs, on credit and risk 
management systems, and on audit results. Six months later, it established unified disclosure 
standards for financial institutions, stipulating that balance sheet information should be reported twice 
annually, and it set stronger penalties for false or dishonest disclosures. A quarterly disclosure 
system1 for banks was subsequently introduced in September 1999. 
In all financial institutions, outside directors, of which there should be at least three, should make up at 
least half of the total membership of the board of directors (Jan. 2000), and an audit committee must 
be established (Jan. 2000). A system calling for compliance officers was also introduced (Apr. 2000). 
In order to strengthen accounting standards, the accounting treatment of financial institutions’ holdings 
of marketable securities has been changed to a mark-to-market system (Jun. 1998-Mar. 2000). 
Introduction of Financial Holding Companies 
Legislative provisions for financial holding companies have been introduced to strengthen financial 
institutions’ competitiveness through enlargement of their scale and scope of business (Nov. 2000). 
For enforcement of the Financial Holding Company Act, the FSC/FSS introduced the “Regulation on 
Supervision of Financial Holding Companies” that sets forth authorization criteria for financial 
companies seeking to become an FHC or a subsidiary of an FHC (Dec. 2000). Since the introduction 
of the legislation, Woori Financial Group (Mar. 2001), Shinhan Financial Group (Sep. 2001), and 
Dongwon Financial Group (May 2003) have been established. 
Improvement of Financial System and Financial Infrastructure for Restructuring 
The government revised relevant financial legislation, including the Depositor Protection Act, the Act 
on the Structural Improvement of the Financial Industry, and the Banking Act, to promote financial 
restructuring at the end of 1997. In consequence, the KDIC and the KAMCO firmly established their 
presence in the market, and PCA enforcement was strengthened. 
In January 1997, the government introduced legislation for a capped partial guarantee system that 
limited the maximum payment payable to an individual depositor to 20 million won, but in December 
1997, the deposit insurance system was changed to a blanket guarantee system to soothe the 
financial instability caused by the financial crisis. However, with moral hazard emerging on the part of 
financial institutions and their depositors, the deposit insurance system shifted back from a blanket 
guarantee system to a capped system in January 2001. Meanwhile, when the partial guarantee 
system was adopted, the maximum amount of payment to an individual depositor was raised from 
20 million to 50 million won. 
In a bid to provide diverse fund-raising measures for financial institutions and corporations, the 
government introduced asset backed securities (Sep. 1998), mortgage backed securities (Apr. 1999), 
and a mutual funds system (Sep. 1998). In addition, to strengthen the transparency and the prudential 
regulation of financial institutions, reform ownership structure, and improve disclosure and accounting 
systems, the government revised financial legislation to bring it in line with international standards. 
III. Developments and Changes 
1. Enhanced Asset Quality 
One of the changes most apparent within the banking system as a whole is banks’ restructured 
balance sheets. 
                                            
1  Detailed matters for disclosures include organization and personnel, finance and net losses/profits, sources and uses of funds, 
soundness, profitability and productivity indicators, management guidelines, and risk management. 
BIS Papers No 28 265
 
Through the injection of public funds for the purchase of NPLs and the recapitalization of banks, along 
with their own efforts to reduce NPLs, banks’ soundness has been considerably enhanced. As a 
result, the NPL ratio of commercial banks declined 11.6 percentage points, from 13.6% at the end of 
1999 to 2.0% by the end of 2004. 
The Basel capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks increased from 7.0% at the end of 1997 to 
11.3% by the end of 2004. 
Trend of NPL1 and BIS Capital Adequacy Ratios of Commercial Banks 
% 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
NPL ratio 6.1 7.4 13.6 8.8 3.3 2.4 2.7 2.0 
BIS ratio 7.0 8.2 10.8 10.5 10.8 10.5 10.4 11.3 
1  NPLs are assets that are classified as substandard or below. 
 
 
2. Enhanced Profitability 
In conjunction with their enhanced asset quality, the profitability of banks has significantly improved. 
Commercial banks continued to pile up large deficits after the crisis until 2000 because they suffered 
from the losses incurred by non-performing loans, but they have shown profits since 2001. 
Strikingly, commercial banks recorded a total profit of 6.4 trillion won and had an average ROA of 
0.9% and ROE of 18.0% in 2004. One of the most crucial elements for the improvement of profitability 
is that it has been possible to reduce new provisions against bad loans. The build-up of interest 
bearing assets and non-interest income from fees and commissions also contributed to improving 
banks’ profitability. 
 
Trend of Profitability of Commercial Banks 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Net profit 
(in trillions of 
won) 
 
 
–3.9 
 
 
–12.5 
 
 
–6.0 
 
 
–2.8 
 
 
3.6 
 
 
3.4 
 
 
0.7 
 
 
6.4 
ROA (%) –0.9 –3.3 –1.3 –0.6 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.9 
ROE (%) –14.2 –52.5 –23.1 –11.9 15.9 11.7 2.0 18.0 
 
3. Increase in Banks’ Share of the Financial Market  
Banks were faster off the mark than non-bank financial institutions in resolving bad assets and 
capitalization, largely because the intensive financial restructuring was undertaken with a focus 
primarily on banks rather than on non-bank financial institutions immediately after the outbreak of the 
financial crisis in 1997. As a result, funds in the financial market flowed into banks owing to the public’s 
renewed heightened confidence in them. Meanwhile, banks increased household lending actively, 
focusing on housing finance loans backed by housing collateral, which carry a low credit risk and 
capital requirement burden. 
Accordingly, the share of loans made by banks in total loans in the financial market rose from 39.2% at 
the end of 1997 to 71.7% at the end of 2004, while the share of non-bank financial institutions dropped 
from 60.8% to 28.3% during the same period. 
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Trend of Bank and Non-Bank Financial Institution Lending 
In trillions of won, % 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Bank 242.9 (39.2) 
233.8 
(41.6) 
273.0 
(49.0) 
328.7 
(57.0) 
366.8 
(60.0) 
516.8 
(69.7) 
586.5 
(71.8) 
609.4 
(71.7) 
Non-bank1 377.5 (60.8) 
328.2 
(58.4) 
283.9 
(51.0) 
247.6 
(43.0) 
244.2 
(40.0) 
224.3 
(30.3) 
230.3 
(28.2) 
240.4 
(28.3) 
Total 620.4 562.0 556.8 576.2 611.0 741.1 816.8 849.8 
The numbers within parentheses represent shares in total loans in the financial market. 
1  Merchant banking corporations, mutual savings banks, credit unions, community credit cooperatives, securities finance, life 
insurance companies, postal savings and insurance, investment trusts, and other depository institutions. 
 
There was an underlying shift from corporate lending toward household credits. As a result, the share 
of household credits rose from 20.0% at the end of 1997 to 55.0% at the end of 2004. 
Two factors underlie this shift. One is the development of the capital markets and the increasing 
availability of direct financing for corporations with good credit. The other is the change in the risk 
appetite of commercial banks. As banks recognized the importance of credit risk management, they 
sought to reduce loan concentrations by introducing exposure limits on corporate loans. This led them 
increasingly to emphasize an expansion of their household credits. 
 
Trend of Shares by Sector in Bank Lending1 
% 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Corporate loans 63.8 63.6 61.9 56.5 48.9 45.5 45.6 43.5 
25.0 22.9 19.0 16.3 10.4  7.6  5.9 5.4 Large companies 
SMEs 38.7 40.6 42.9 40.2 38.4 38.0 39.7 38.2 
Household loans 20.0 18.3 34.3 39.0 49.1 52.9 53.0 55.0 
Others2 16.3 18.1 3.8 4.6 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.4 
1  Excludes trust account lending.   2  Loans to public and other legal entities. 
 
4. Increased Market Concentration Resulting from Mergers 
Market concentration has risen greatly due to mergers between banks, but not to such a degree as to 
raise concern over the weakness of market competition. CR3 (Concentration Ratio 3) rose from 24.7% 
at the end of 1997 to 48.6% at the end of 2004, but this is still much lower than the 70% level which is 
the criterion for prohibition of abuse of market dominance. The Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) was 
1,209 at the end of 2004, but this is well below the 1,800 which is the United States Department of 
Justice’s yardstick for a concentrated market. 
 
 
Trends in Market Concentration Indexes1 of Banking Market2 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
CR1 (%) 8.9 9.8 11.8 13.1 23.2 22.7 21.1 19.5 
CR3 (%) 24.7 27.0 33.5 35.6 46.4 46.3 49.5 48.6 
HHI 569 628 755 822 1,158 1,185 1,248 1,209 
1  Total asset basis.   2  Commercial banks, industrial banks, and agricultural·fisheries cooperatives. 
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Despite the rise in market concentration indexes, market competition has been fiercer in some ways 
due to struggle for market leadership among nation-wide commercial banks. The government, the 
BOK, and the supervisory agency have continued to pay close attention to the state of market 
competition, keeping a close eye on the significant changes in the financial landscape brought about 
by, for example, the birth of megabanks from mergers between domestic banks, or the acquisition of 
domestic banks by prominent foreign banks. 
5. Increased Market Share of Foreign-Owned Banks 
During the restructuring process, the government pursued a policy of encouraging the entry of foreign 
banks. All the regulatory obstacles that stood in the way of foreign entry have been eased, and as long 
as foreign banks are able to prove the soundness of their management and funding resources, they 
can enter the banking industry. In addition, foreign investors, including financial institutions, saw the 
Korean banking industry as a very attractive market. 
Thus, since the financial crisis in 1997, there have been frequent cases of foreign capital participating 
in the domestic banking industry by outright acquisition or by taking a capital stake. 
There are a number of positive effects of the entry of foreign banks in the domestic banking industry. 
Even if domestic economic conditions were to deteriorate substantially (e.g. in case of a financial 
crisis), there would be little possibility of bank runs on foreign banks with high credibility. Furthermore, 
the presence of foreign banks would reduce the likelihood of hoarding as depositors would be able to 
transfer their deposits from ailing domestic banks to the large foreign banks. In addition, even in the 
downturn phase, foreign banks are able to provide credit to borrowers readily thanks to their ability to 
raise funds from parent banks. Moreover, foreign banks use advanced risk management skills, which 
are absorbed by domestic banks. They are also likely to stand ready as counterparts when domestic 
banks want to enter into risk hedging transactions. 
At the same time, there are some negative effects from foreign capital participation in the Korean 
banking industry. Foreign banks have a tendency to avoid lending to borrowers with comparatively 
high risks, such as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups. They also tend to 
emphasize short-term, performance-oriented management due to their focus on stockholder value. 
IV. Future Tasks 
Korean banks’ improved profitability is attributable to the recovery of asset quality and the asset 
growth achieved through early restructuring initiatives. In view of this, it is still too early to say whether 
their profitability has become stable. For Korean banks to successfully meet the challenges of the 
ever-evolving financial environment and acquire global competitiveness, much effort and systemic 
improvement is still needed. 
1. Risk Management and Risk-Based Supervisory Systems 
In the new financial setting, a comprehensive management system must be created for the varying 
credit, liquidity, and market risks, together with other risks. Gaining the confidence of the markets by 
preemptive action to cut potential losses to investors and other shareholders through improved risk 
management skills is not a goal but a necessity. This goes hand in hand with the exercise of effective 
internal controls. 
Banks need risk management systems that cater to their particular needs. To make risk management 
effective, management accountability must be specific and clearly spelled out. At the same time, 
banks need to set up their compensation systems in line with risk management performance. 
Moreover, they should cultivate the training of professionals capable of designing object-centric 
databases for the more sophisticated risk management systems. There must be a constant flow of 
investment to bring together risk management model analysis, regulatory interpretation, and 
technological expertise. 
Despite the wide array of measures that have been taken to improve financial supervision so far, the 
improvement of the supervisory system is a never-ending task. The supervisory system should be 
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preemptive and risk-based, should allow for early warning, and should be market-friendly. In other 
words, financial supervision should start with preemptive risk management of financial institutions and 
markets using forward-looking criteria. Risks detected in the process of monitoring should be grasped 
swiftly and decisively, and supervisory resources should be reallocated towards those parts of the 
financial sector where the greatest risks are found to reside. Financial supervision should proceed, in a 
market-friendly way, with a series of activities such as early detection, accurate assessment, and 
optimal control of risks exposed in the markets, and should implement prompt corrective measures 
decisively to avoid failure. 
The supervisory agency has set year-end 2007 as the target date for the implementation of the new 
Basel Capital Framework (Basel II), taking into consideration the potential effects of the new accord on 
the domestic economy and financial markets, and the progress of domestic banks’ preparations for the 
implementation. All domestic and foreign banks operating in Korea are to come under the new capital 
adequacy framework. The selection of the methodologies to be used for calculation of the capital 
requirement is to be left to each individual bank. 
The implementation of Basel II is expected to upgrade the level of risk management of domestic banks 
and thereby promote their sound management and competence, along with their financial stability and 
economic growth, in the long run. However, there are also some concerns about a potential increase 
of the capital burden on banks, a contraction of financing for SMEs financing and of the securitization 
market in response to heightened risk management, increasing pro-cyclicality, etc. Taking these 
concerns into account, the Korean financial authority will deliberate how to set the national discretion 
items of Basel II when making the national rules for the new accord. These efforts will help minimize 
the possible negative impacts of Basel II on the domestic financial market. Korean banks have been 
striving to upgrade their risk management systems and increase their capital levels, aided by improved 
profitability in the last few years. All in all, the choice of year-end 2007 is expected to give domestic 
banks sufficient time to cope with these issues and prepare for the full implementation of the new 
accord. 
2. Business Diversification and Profitability 
Banks came to a clear recognition of the importance of sound management in the course of 
overcoming the financial crisis. Thus, they have since managed their assets with a focus on stability 
and profitability. The share of household loans rose remarkably, mainly owing to the great expansion 
of loans secured by housing collateral, while the share of corporate loans, which carry comparatively 
higher credit risk, dropped. The share of low-risk bonds, such as treasury bonds and monetary 
stabilization bonds, in total securities investments also rose. Banks’ behavioral changes in asset 
management contributed to their enhanced profitability and asset soundness. However, these 
phenomena also raised concerns that the efficiency of funds allocation to the national economy as a 
whole could be worsened since banks’ assets now suffer from an over-concentration in a specific 
sector. 
Accordingly, the function of banks’ fund distribution to the national economy as a whole needs to be 
revitalized. It is becoming more important for banks to avoid cut-throat competition in specific asset 
markets and to generate new lucrative business activities by specializing in business areas of 
comparative advantage on the basis of their business characteristics. For example, it is helpful for 
large banks to expand their investment banking and international finance business, while small and 
medium-sized banks should specialize in relationship banking such as lending to SMEs. In addition, 
the credit derivatives market needs to be galvanized and brought to a level of sophistication where 
banks can manage credit risk effectively, in line with the implementation of Basel II at year-end 2007. 
Strategically, banks need to heighten their profitability by securing appropriate interest rate spreads 
and performing better in terms of fee-based income. Banks not only should step up their credit review 
and ex post management to prevent additional bad assets, but also be sure to maintain appropriate 
interest rate spreads that incorporate borrowers’ credit risks. 
New financial products and services must be developed to provide convenience to customers while 
improving profitability. Banks should have a system that identifies and discerns customer needs to 
provide products and services accordingly. For banks to be competitive in today’s market, in which 
information revolves around the customer, they must develop specific products and carry out 
marketing initiatives to create more value through deep data mining and customer analysis. 
